Norm Acceptance and Fitting Attitudes

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Norm Acceptance and Fitting Attitudes Howard Nye University of Michigan Abstract: I offer a way to distinguish between the kinds of reasons for attitudes that contribute to the instantiation of ethical concepts and the kinds that do not, thus solving what Rabinowicz and Ronnow-Rasmussen call the ‘wrong kind of reasons [WKR]’ problem for analyses of ethical concepts in terms of fitting attitudes. Intuitively, judgments about ethical-fact-making reasons for an attitude can, whereas judgments about other kinds of reasons cannot, directly cause one to have the attitude. I argue, however, that in order to clarify and defend this intuitive distinction, we should ultimately analyze judgments about fitting attitudes in terms of the acceptance of norms for attitudes. I contend that the best such analysis understands judgments about an agent’s reasons as judgments about the prescriptions of the system of norms she deeply accepts. I call this view ‘Norm Descriptivism’, and argue that it best explains how judgments about reasons both guide attitudes and can be determined to be true or false via a priori reflective-equilibrium methods. Norm Acceptance and Fitting Attitudes Howard Nye I. Introduction Fitting attitude analyses of ethical concepts seek to analyze them in terms of the fittingness of attitudes like desires and emotions. For instance, A.C. Ewing (1939) may be read as arguing that we can understand judgments that a state of affairs is good as judgments that it is fitting to desire it.1 Similarly, Allan Gibbard (1990) argues that we can analyze judgments that someone has done something morally blameworthy as judgments to the effect that it is fitting for him to feel guilt for what he has done, and fitting for others to feel angry at him for doing it. I think that such fitting attitude analyses [hereafter ‘FA-analyses’] are attractive because they offer us a
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