Chou and BTT did not have a blinding or enforceable contact. 2. What fact may weigh in favor of or against Chou in terms of the parties’ objective intent to contract? BTT manufactures, and distributes board games and other toys. BTT was interested in distributing Strat and entered an agreement to pay Chou $25,000.00 Strat is a new strategy game that Chou invented.
A factor benefitting Chou is BTT paid him 25K for negotiation rights for a 90-day period. Both parties agreed to an agreement using a combination of offer and acceptance called mutual assent (Melvin, 2011). Because BTT paid Chou 25K (there must be a receipt somewhere), there was an enforceable agreement between Chou and BTT. A court of law may consider this evidence of intent. Although an oral agreement was reached at the meeting between the two, there was a negotiation agreement stating exclusively that no distribution agreement was in place, unless in writing, and therefore there was no official agreement between the parties (Melvin, 2011).
1. At what point, if ever, did the parties have a contract? “One generally accepted definition of a contract is a promise or a set of promises enforceable by law” (Melvin, 2011, p. 194). In this scenario, Big Time Toymaker entered into an option contract with Chou. “BTT was interested in distributing Strat and entered into an agreement with Chou whereby BTT paid him $25,000 in exchange for exclusive negotiation rights for a 90-day period” (Melvin, 2011, p. 155).
BTT inquired about distributing Strat and paid Chou $25,000 in exchange for exclusive negotiation rights for a 90-day period. This fact actually can play a big role against Chou. 3. Does the fact that the parties were communicating by e-mail have any impact on your analysis in Questions 1 and 2 (above)? Electronic communication is as effective as paper communication.
I believe that Big Time Toymaker (BTT) and Chou had a contract when they had a meeting after the original agreement expired. When the meeting took place the parties reached an oral agreement to distribute the game. Then later on an e-mail was sent from a BTT manager labeled “Strat deal”. The facts can be that both parties had an agreement that BTT would pay Chou $25,000 for the exclusive rights of the game for a 90 day period. Another fact can be the oral agreement that was discussed in the meeting the two parties had along with the e-mail that was sent from a BTT manager stating the agreement in the e-mail.
At the time he started working the stock price was $11 per share. Now that the share price is $25 per share, he intends to exercise all of the options. Two years later Bad Brad sells the stock for $27 per share, what is Bad Brad's basis in his stock for purposes of calculating the gain or
What facts may weigh in favor of or against Chou in terms of the parties’ objective intent to contract? The facts that weigh in favor of or against Chou in terms of the parties objective intent to contract is the mere fact that BTT paid Chou $25,000 for the negotiation legal rights to his board game, which made Chou assume that there was a deal of a distribution agreement as well. This in fact could work in Chou’s favor although both parties made a verbal agreement no written agreements were signed to confirm the facts as notated within the email. Nonetheless the new administration had every right to remove Chou from the distribution of his board game because there were no written or signed contract rather than honoring a verbal contract. “The exclusive negotiation agreement stipulated that no distribution contract existed unless it was in writing” (Melvin, 2011 pg.
They would make semiannual payments of $12.303 million and can sell the equipment at the end of its 25-year useful life at $40.185 million. If Acela’s revenue expectations are not met and Amtrak remains unprofitable, the present value of the cost of this option would be 260.26 million. Assuming profitable, the present value of the costs would become approximately $164.77 million due to the benefit of the tax shield. Also, Amtrak is considering an 80% debt to 20% equity leveraged-lease structure to finance the locomotives and train sets. They would make semiannual payments and has the option to buy the equipment from the equity investor, BNY Capital
The contract was an exclusive contract. It started with BTT was interested in distributing Strat, and the agreement was with Chou and BTT on an exclusive negotiation rights for 90 days. With this exclusive there was a $25,000 exchange. The stipulations of this negotiation was that there be no distribution contract existed unless it was in writing. Before the expiration period, the parties had reached an oral agreement.
BTT’s manager posted an e-mail to Chou describing the conditions of a distribution contract; however, this does not make the email an agreement until the parties both sign it. This is only considered a verbal deal because it is not a legally binding draft containing signatures of both parties involved. What facts may weigh in favor of or against Chou in terms of the parties’ objective intent to contract? Chou would believe that BTT was interested in arriving at an agreement on a distribution offer because BTT paid Chou $25,000 for the unique negotiation legal rights to his board game (Melvin, 2011). This is a fact that would weigh in support of Chou; however, both parties only made a verbal offer and not a written agreement to demonstrate this fact.